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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ANALYTIC APOSTERIORI AND A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS THAT IS EXHIBITED IN THE LIVED
EXPERIENCES OF THOSE SEEKING TO MARRY SOMEONE OF
THE SAME SEX

VINCENT J. SAMAR*
The purpose of this essay is to suggest a new direction in our thinking
about substantive due process that recognizes human rights in the lived
experience of our fellow human beings. The applicability of the approach, at
least for equal protection purposes, was hinted at by the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, but it has never been given full
consideration.1 There, Justice Kennedy noted the very real impact of a state

* Vincent J. Samar is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law and also an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at both Loyola
University Chicago and Oakton Community College. He is the author of two books and
numerous articles. The author wants to thank Professor Mark Strasser of Capital University Law
School for his insightful legal and philosophical comments to an earlier version of this article,
Professor Victoria S. Wike of Loyola University Chicago, Philosophy Department for her critical
response to my use of the analytic aposteriori, Professor Jona Goldschmidt of Loyola University
Chicago, Criminal Justice Department for his careful check of the grammar, and Philosophy
Professor Daniel Kynaston, of Oakton Community College for his support of the
phenomenological viewpoint expressed. This article is dedicated to all those who have remained
steadfast in the fight for same-sex marriage equality.
1. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). Romer involved a constitutional
challenge to Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution that “prohibits all legislative, executive or
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . homosexual
persons or gays and lesbians.” Id. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy hinted at an approach
that takes the meaning of precepts from our lived experience when he relied on “the authoritative
construction of Colorado’s Supreme Court” as to what the amendment does. Id. at 626.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court:
The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at minimum, to repeal existing statutes,
regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination
based on sexual orientation. . . . The “ultimate effect” of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes, regulations,
ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is first amended to permit
such measures.
Id. at 626–27 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d. 1270, 1284–85 & n.25 (Colo. 1993) (citations
omitted). Justice Kennedy understood this construction to mean:
Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by this law. So much
is evident from the ordinances that the Colorado Supreme Court declared would be void
377
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constitutional amendment prohibiting antidiscrimination legislation against a
group of people. What he did not say is how such an amendment might also
impact the self-impression gays and lesbians have of themselves, although this
would certainly be part of such an amendment’s impact. Moreover, legal and
philosophical research in this area suggests that there may be more here than
previously thought. While I do not hope to resolve every philosophical
question at the heart of my legal analysis, I do intend to bring forth enough
substance to answer the indeterminacy charge levied by certain Supreme Court
justices and others concerning which rights should count as “fundamental”
under substantive due process in part by looking at the impact such rights have
on individual self-esteem.
I. THE PROBLEM
Substantive due process is the term applied when American courts use the
due process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to identify
unenumerated general rights in the Constitution “that reserve to the individual
the power to possess or to do certain things, despite the government’s desire to

by operation of Amendment 2. Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.
The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection
from injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies.
Id. at 627.
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), similarly
follows along this same line. In Lawrence, a Texas statute had made it a crime for members of
the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse,” being defined as “any contact between
any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.” Id. at 563 (citing
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003)). In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor
notes, with respect to the lived experience of persons in the petitioners’ position, that
[T]he effect of the Texas’ sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution or
consequence of conviction. Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals,
thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as
everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of
the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law “legally sanctions
discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal
law” . . . .
Id. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex.
App. 1992)). Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion also picks up on this theme when he states:
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. The offense, to be sure,
is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it remains
a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged. The
petitioners will bear on their record the history of their criminal convictions. Just this
Term we rejected various challenges to state laws requiring the registration of sex
offenders.
Id. at 575 (majority opinion).
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the contrary.”2 The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”3 The Fourteenth Amendment similarly provides in pertinent part:
“No state shall make or enforce any law . . . [to] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”4 In instances where the
courts determine that due process requires more than compliance with a
particular procedure, but actual recognition of rights to liberty (including
sexual liberty) or property, the argument’s basis is substantive rather than
procedural. Obvious examples of the former include the right of a parent to
direct the education of her child,5 the rights of married6 and unmarried7 couples
to have access to contraception, the right of minors to receive contraceptives,8
and the right of a woman to choose whether to continue a pregnancy.9 It also
includes the right of two adults to engage in private consensual same-sex,
noncommercial, sexual activity in the home.10
The right to contract under the clause has been substantially diminished
from its initial beginnings when the Supreme Court first ruled that under the
contract clause, incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state could not limit the number of hours a baker could work.11 That decision
would eventually be disavowed when the Court subsequently upheld minimum
wage legislation in the State of Washington.12 This latter change in the
property area represented a significant retraction from the Court’s earlier
libertarian view of property rights to a more social welfare construction in
which the political branches could offset market anomalies to further the public
welfare.13 But it also raises the question: how resilient are rights recognized
under the due process clauses from later erosion? More importantly, it

2. Substantive Due Process, STANFORD, http://www.stanford.edu/group/psylawseminar/
Substantive%20Due%20Process.htm (last visited Jun. 19, 2011).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. In Meyer v. Nebraska, Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, stated that the
“liberty” protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “[w]ithout doubt . . .
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
8. Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
13. Id. at 391–93.
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bespeaks the difficulty that some justices have had in determining exactly what
substantive rights the due process clause encompasses, if any. If the due
process clause protects only “fundamental rights,” then the question arises:
which rights are fundamental?14 Here, one finds the Court in search of a
method to delineate the importance of various rights.15
It might be noted that I have not drawn a substantive distinction between
the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because the
distinction is less concerned with which rights are present and more concerned
with which level of government those rights might be asserted against. The
Fifth Amendment restricts the federal government; it was adopted as part of
the compromise to adopt the Constitution of 1787 to prevent an overarching
central government from intruding on the individual prerogatives of the states
and rights of the citizens.16 The Fourteenth Amendment applies against state
governments; it was adopted after the end of the Civil War and after the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, because of, among other things, a
recommendation of a Joint Committee of Congress that “extensively
catalogued the abuses of civil rights in the former slave states” and
recommended that “adequate security for future peace and safety . . . can only
be found in such changes of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights
and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic.”17
Since its adoption, the Court has, in a piece meal fashion, “incorporated”18
various provisions of the Bill of Rights to apply against the states, most
recently the Second Amendment.19 Interestingly, because the Court has
sometimes enunciated new unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, not previously recognized as applying against the federal
government under the Fifth Amendment, the Court has also used the Fifth

14. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Thomas provided that “fundamental” is “a term
the Court has long struggled to define.” 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3061 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. In his majority opinion in McDonald, Justice Alito stated: “The relationship between the
Bill of Rights’ guarantees and the States must be governed by a single, neutral principle.” Id. at
3048. “[W]e have never held a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if there is
a ‘popular consensus’ that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule.” Id. at
3049. In this particular case, the majority paid particular note to the Amici who contended “that
the right [right to keep and bear arms] is especially important for women and members of other
groups that may be especially vulnerable to violent crime.” Id.
16. Substantive Due Process, supra note 2; see, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 234–37, 278, 290, 291 (1985).
17. Substantive Due Process, supra note 2; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
18. The “incorporations doctrine” advocated by Justice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright was a
theory of “selective incorporation” in which the due process clause would be used to incorporate
particular rights against the states contained in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights as
the Court would find them to be “fundamental.” 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).
19. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
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Amendment in so-called “reverse incorporation” to ensure those rights also
restricted the federal government, a needed result if the right is to be thought
truly fundamental.20
Having identified the Court’s long-standing search for a theory of which
rights are fundamental, the question we must now ask concerns how to identify
those rights. One standard approach is to ask if the right “is fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty, or . . . ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.’”21 Conservative justices, however, criticize some of the Court’s
recent decisions for adopting “a far less measurable range of criteria” to
encompass a “liberty of the person both in its special and its more transcendent
dimensions.”22 The controversy begs the question of whether the Court has
determined an approach to discover the liberties protected under the due
process clauses. Put another way, what is the concept of ordered liberty and
what is it that is sought when asking whether a claimed right is “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition?”
In Palko v. Connecticut,23 the defendant claimed that a sentence of death
for first degree murder, following a retrial after the state appealed his
conviction for second degree murder, violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by twice putting him in jeopardy of life or limb.24 In
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of the State of
Connecticut, which had affirmed the conviction, Justice Cardozo referenced
the different provisions of the Bill of Rights.25 He then wrote that a

20. For example, in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court reverse incorporated its desegregation rule to apply to the schools
of the District of Columbia. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
21. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (“These decisions make it clear
that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”).
22. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 562 (2002)).
23. Palko, 302 U.S. at 319–22.
24. Id.
25. At this point, the Bill of Rights had not been firmly deemed fundamental. The Court
stated the following:
The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that no person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury. This court has held that, in prosecutions by a state, presentment or indictment
by a grand jury may give way to informations at the instance of a public officer. The
Fifth Amendment provides also that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. This court has said that, in prosecutions by a state, the
exemption will fail if the state elects to end it. The Sixth Amendment calls for a jury trial
in criminal cases and the Seventh for a jury trial in civil cases at common law where the
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background organizing principle might still be identified from the traditions
and conscience of the people:
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty
catalogue of the cases on the one side and the other. Reflection and analysis
will induce a different view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing
principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence. The
right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of
an indictment may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a
“principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
26
to be ranked as fundamental.”

The passage suggests that Justice Cardozo was of two minds with regard to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the one hand, he
seems to be suggesting that what is essential to the scheme of ordered liberty is
how we identify those rights, which the due process clause protects. On the
other hand, because he fails to be more specific about how essentiality is
determined, he inasmuch accepts that many important rights, like the right to
trial by jury, will not be considered essential. Still, he was insightful in first
giving recognition to the fact that such a right would have to be at “the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.” And, second, that to be ranked
fundamental, such a right must be connected to “a principle of
justice . . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.”27
The debate that Justice Cardozo joined posited those justices, like himself,
who believed in “selective incorporation” against those justices, like Black and
Douglas, who supported “total incorporation.”28 Justice Frankfurter took a
middle position. He believed due process prohibits practices that “offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples.”29 The debate on the Court ranged over three separate
issues: first, over history and whether the framers of the Fourteenth

value in controversy should exceed $20. This court has ruled that consistently with those
amendments trial by jury may be modified by a state or abolished altogether. . . .
On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it
unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First
Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress or the like freedom of the
press, or the free exercise of religion, or the right of peaceful assembly, without which
speech would be unduly trampled, or the right of one accused of a crime to the benefit of
counsel.
Id. at 323–24 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 325 (citations omitted).
27. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936)) (citing Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
28. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Amendment intended for it to apply all the Bill of Rights against the states;
second, over federalism and whether “[a]pplying the Bill of Rights to the states
imposes a substantial set of restrictions on state and local governments”; and
third, over judicial restraint in furtherance of democracy in judging whether
“selective incorporation gives judges far too much discretion in deciding what
rights are fundamental.”30 Though I am not here considering the question of
incorporation, the debate is relevant to uncovering the Court’s answer to the
question of what kinds of rights are brought under the substantive due process
clauses: the answer is those rights that are fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty.
Relying on aspects of this debate, Justice Thomas was alone among recent
justices in stating his view that the “Establishment Clause is a federalism
provision, which for this reason, resists incorporation.”31 Under Justice
Thomas’ view, if the Establishment Clause gives rise to a right against
government establishment of religion, it is not a fundamental right because, by
its language, it would seem to apply only against the federal government
establishing religion, not against the state governments doing so.32
Previously, the Court had decided Washington v. Glucksberg,33 a case
concerning whether a state statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
offends the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
holding that it does not, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s
history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost every State—indeed, in
almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide. The States’
assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding
expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of all
human life. Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide—and,
therefore, of assisting suicide—are consistent and enduring themes of our
34
philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages.

What the Court seems to be suggesting here is that an indication of the status
of a right is whether there has been a long standing and perhaps wide ranging

30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 501–02 (3d
ed. 2006).
31. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
32. See id.
33. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
34. Id. at 710–11 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990)
(“[T]he States—indeed, all civilized nations—demonstrate their commitment to life by treating
homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . .
the pattern of enacted laws . . . .”)).
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acceptance of the right, at least among Western democracies.35 Otherwise, it is
not fundamental, even though it is recognized in some states, if other states are
free to make laws that prohibit what the right protects and it is not generally
recognized among Western democracies. Of course, the question remains how
to ascertain whether there is a long-standing and perhaps wide-ranging
acceptance of the right. Does one look to history, some widely understood
view of what the right encompasses, perhaps by some form of conceptual
analysis, or to still something else?
The problem is that no specific criteria emerge from these cases for
determining whether a right is fundamental or not. This leaves recognition of
particular unenumerated substantive due process rights open to various
Justices’ interpretations—for example, Justice Scalia theorizing that they only
exist if they are what the framers intended when they wrote this part of the
Constitution.36 Or, from a different theoretical direction it would not be hard
to imagine Justice Thomas impliedly asking—though he was only at the time
talking about the Establishment Clause—if applying a certain right against the
states would seriously offend other constitutional provisions. And, of course,
if one approaches the matter empirically, to ask whether there has there been a
long-standing philosophical, legal, or cultural opposition against this right,
then we would be at a loss to explain, from a judicial perspective, the Court’s
current acceptance of a fundamental right to contraception, abortion, etc. Of
interest too is that these potential criteria should be empirical as opposed to
being based on either some hierarchical moral system from which the right
might derive, or even just some searching analysis of the concept of
substantive due process.
II. THE DEBATE
The current debate over what rights are found within (or fall under)
substantive due process is amply reflected in a recent set of judicial opinions
from Justices Scalia and Stevens,37 as well as in scholarly writings by Gordon
S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin.38 For
purposes of this discussion, I will be focusing primarily on the writings of
Scalia and Dworkin.
What does the Constitution mean and how is it to be interpreted? In A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Justice Scalia writes:

35. See id.
36. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
37. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050–88 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Id. at 3088–120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 36, at 47.
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If the Courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it
the way the majority wants; the appointment and confirmation process will see
to that. This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be
committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the majority. By
trying to make the Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to
39
age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.

Justice Scalia describes the current debate over interpretation not as centered
on the question of
Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original
meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.
The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of
what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal
statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a
changing society. And it is the judges who determine those needs and “find”
40
that changing law.

According to Justice Scalia, The Living Constitution school of thought
incorporates “a common-law way of making law, and not the way of
construing a democratically adopted text.”41 In Justice Scalia’s view, the
Constitution is best understood not as living but as enduring.42 And it is the
attempt to change from this understanding that is its primary problem.
[I]f the people come to believe that the Constitution is not a text like other
texts; that it means, not what it says or what it was understood to mean, but
what it should mean, in light of the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of an enduring society”—well, then, they will look for
qualifications other than impartiality, judgment, and lawyerly acumen in those
who they select to interpret it. More specifically, they will look for judges who
agree with them as to what the evolving standards have evolved to; who agree
43
with them as to what the Constitution ought to be.

39. Id. “Professor McBain of the Columbia University Law School published a book in
1927 entitled The Living Constitution. . . . The first meaning was expressed over a half-century
ago by Mr. Justice Holmes . . . .” William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976). The pragmatist view is that interpretation of the Constitution may
change according to evolving social changes. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1347–48 (1988).
40. SCALIA, supra note 36, at 38.
41. Id. at 40.
42. In First Things magazine, Justice Scalia wrote: “[T]he Constitution that I interpret and
apply is not living but dead—or, as I prefer to put it, enduring. It means today not what current
society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.”
Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 17 (2002), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/gods-justice-and-ours-32.
43. SCALIA, supra note 36, at 46–47.
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Justice Scalia wants in the name of democratic principle to essentially
freeze constitutional language to only what it meant at its origination and was
understood to encompass by those who wrote it. In this way, he believes the
Bill of Rights endures to protect rights—but only those rights—that would
have been recognized at the time of its adoption. Of course, this would mean
that the right to marry someone of a different race could not be a fundamental
right, notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia.44 Questions
concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty, a woman’s right to
choose whether to continue a pregnancy, the right to marry someone of the
same sex, and to receive an education or health care would be resolved by
appeal to the expectations at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Similarly, whether limitations could alter previously understood rights to
property and freedom of religion would also be based on the understandings of
the Framers at the time of adoption. I do not mean to suggest that Justice
Scalia would not consider any cases since that time, but the gloss by which
new rights would be discovered or old rights extended would be limited by the
expectations of the Framers.
Professor Ronald Dworkin challenges Justice Scalia’s view. Dworkin
notes an important distinction between two forms of interpretativism, both of
which comport with original intent. The first “‘semantic’ originalism . . .
insists that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who made
them intended to say, and [the second] ‘expectation’ originalism . . . holds that
these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who
made them expected them to have.”45 In other words, when looking at
constitutional provisions, including those contained in the Bill of Rights, one
notes that sometimes the original language is very concrete; other times, like
with the words “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment, it is abstract.
For instance, “the various provisions for criminal and civil process in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments do not speak of ‘fair’, or ‘due’
[process] or ‘unusual’ procedures [as in the later part of the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments] but lay down very concrete provisions,” such as the
requirement that a warrant be issued based on probable cause before there can
be a search of “persons, houses, papers or effects.”46 Similarly, concrete
language is used “for the same offense [not] to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,”47 the guarantee of a “right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury,”48 to confront witnesses against oneself,49 to “compulsory

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 36, at 115, 119.
Id. at 121–22
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
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process,”50 and the right to trial by jury in a civil matter “where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”51 Dworkin believes the choice of
language signals an intent by the Framers that some provisions should hold fast
over time while others should be subject to the changing moral sentiments of
the society.52
Dworkin’s analysis brings us to the conclusion that “expectation
originalism” is not a morally neutral view in constitutional interpretation, but a
present desire to limit the rights founded, for example, under substantive due
process to only those accepted at a much earlier time.53 This may have the
benefit of guaranteeing previously accepted rights, but only at the cost of
ignoring, what the Framers apparently did recognize, that the evolution of
society’s understandings in certain areas ought to be given constitutional
protection.54 Dworkin’s answer to Scalia’s concern that this would be the end
of the Bill of Rights is: “History disagrees. Justices whose methods seem
closest to the moral reading of the Constitution have been champions, not
enemies, of individual rights . . . .”55 Justice Scalia’s only response to
Dworkin’s history argument is to assert: “Well, there is not really much history
to go on,” probably “only forty years.”56 Moreover, he may very well disagree
with those whose rights recent history has recognized57 as itself a limitation on
those whose rights he believes ought to be recognized—perhaps the rights of
the unborn58 or those whose religious beliefs are offended by seemingly neutral
policies at, for example, public universities requiring all recognized groups,

50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
52. Dworkin, supra note 45, at 122. Dworkin notes that had the Framers “intended a dated
provision, they could and would have written an explicit one. Of course, we cannot imagine
Madison or any of his contemporaries doing that: they wouldn’t think it appropriate to protect
what they took to be a fundamental right in such terms. But that surely means that the dated
translation would be a plain mistranslation.” Id.
53. See id. at 119.
54. See id. at 120–22.
55. Id. at 126–27.
56. Antonin Scalia, Response, in SCALIA, supra note 36, at 129, 149 (responding to
Professor Dworkin’s history argument).
57. Such as women’s reproductive rights, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aff’d in part by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and the rights of adult gay persons to freely
engage in same-sex, noncommercial sexual relationships in the home, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Constitution makes no mention of a right to abortion nor would such a right have been
recognized when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted).
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including religious groups, to grant equal access to all students who want to
join.59
III. EPISTEMIC AND LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE
Philosophers draw two types of distinctions applicable to human
understandings: the first is a conceptual/logical distinction concerning how the
truth of a proposition is determined; the second is an epistemic distinction
concerning how we go about justifying a proposition as true. The first
distinction separates propositions that are analytic from those that are
synthetic. The second separates how the truth of propositions is determined,
either from empirical experience or outside of empirical experience.
Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meanings alone. The
principle of identity is what confirms them.60 The idea is often stated that the
meaning of the predicate term is encompassed within the meaning of the
subject term.61 An example of an analytic proposition is: “All squares are four
equal sided figures.” The proposition is true given our definition of a square.
Synthetic propositions are not true by virtue of their meanings alone.62 The
truth (or in this example falsity) of the statement “all two-legged creatures are
mammals” cannot be determined from the meaning of its subject and predicate
terms alone. Outside information is required, namely, information from
biology and zoology.63
If the truth of a proposition is justified by an appeal to experience we say
the justification is a posteriori.64 An example of an a posteriori proposition is:
“The Willis Tower is the tallest building in Chicago.” Empirically measuring
the height of the Willis Tower and comparing that measurement to the height
of other buildings in Chicago determines its truth. In contrast, logical and
mathematical propositions are not justified by experience.65 The justification
of these propositions is outside of experience, in which case we say the
justification is a priori.66 An example of an a priori proposition is: “Nothing
can both be and not be in the same way at the same time.” What justifies the
truth of this proposition is that we cannot think it false.
What is of interest to judgment in general is what happens when we cross
the analytic-synthetic distinction with the a priori-a posteriori distinction.
59. Christian Legal Society v. Hastings, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007–09 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, J.J.).
60. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 48 (Norman K. Smith trans., St. Martin’s
Press unabr. ed. 1965) (1781).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 48–49.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 42–43.
65. Id. at 52.
66. KANT, supra note 60, at 52.
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Immanuel Kant was the first to do this, while trying to resolve David Hume’s
problem of trying to connect our many separate distinct experiences in
personal identity.67 Kant recognized three interesting outcomes in crossing the
logical distinction with the epistemic one. Some propositions were analytic-a
priori like “all bachelors are unmarried men” because the meaning of the
predicate was contained in the subject and the truth of the proposition was thus
determined without appeal to empirical experience. Some others were
synthetic-a posteriori. For example, eventually science showed that “water is
H2O.” At least at the time water was first chemically analyzed, this would
have been a synthetic-a posteriori proposition. The predicate “is H2O” would
not have been part of the original definition of water because until that time it
would not have been known. Through much of history and even today in
many places, a parent might tell their child to go fetch some water without any
understanding of its chemical nature. The proposition, “water is H2O,” was
justified by scientists’ discoveries in their laboratories while doing a chemical
analysis. So far, this seems pretty non-controversial.
What Kant proposed was that certain propositions might be neither
analytic-a priori nor synthetic-a posteriori but, instead, synthetic-a priori.
Here, the predicate would not be contained in the subject; nevertheless its truth
would be established outside of experience.68 Two examples Kant used were:
“7 + 5 = 12” and “[t]he shortest distance between two points is a straight
line.”69 In the former case, 12 is not contained in 7, 5, or our understanding of
“+”.70 That is to say, if we were able to count only up to 10, we could
understand the placement on the number line of 5 and 7. We also could
presumably understand “+”, at least insofar as we could add numbers whose
sum was 10 or less, without suggesting that 12 be contained in our
understanding of any of these prior terms. In the latter case, the idea of a
straight line is not contained in “the shortest distance between two points.”71
On a sphere, the shortest distance would be a geodesic. However, Kant

67. David Hume was an empiricist who believed all our knowledge of matters of fact arose
from impressions. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 4 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740). However, when Hume tried to account for the
cause/effect relation, he had no impression of the force or necessary connection. Id. at 77. This
led him to conjecture that the cause/effect relation was imposed on experience by habit of the
mind. Id. at 93. However, when he then turned his attention to how the mind connects its many
discrete impressions, he had no impression that would allow him to account for personal identity.
Id. at 635–36. In the Appendix to the Treatise on Human Nature, Hume confesses accounting for
personal identity may be a problem for “[o]thers, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature
reflection.” Id. at 636.
68. KANT, supra note 60, at 52–53.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 53.
71. Id.
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thought that no propositions would satisfy the analytic-a posteriori crossover,
“[f]or, before appealing to experience, I have already in the concept . . . all the
conditions required for my judgment.”72
Because I believe Kant may be wrong on this last point, I will propose an
analytic-a posteriori approach to further our understanding of judgments,
without denying what may already be understood about the crossover of the
logical and epistemic, or how it might apply to unraveling concerns of
substantive due process. I do not intend disagreement with the more synthetica priori Kantian approach I have taken elsewhere;73 instead, I intend to show
that a bottom-up (analytic-a posteriori) approach that meets at the same point
as my earlier top-down (synthetic-a priori) approach provides even greater
persuasive support for the validity of a rights claim capable of satisfying both
positions.
Before beginning that process, however, I should fully explain Kant’s
understanding of the synthetic-a priori in respect to moral philosophy because
it is relevant to the normative language of law. The other approaches, such as
the analytic-a priori or the synthetic-a posteriori, can also be used to identify
the legal/normative meanings of already existing terms or to note what norms
society currently attaches to an existing legal doctrine such as due process.
But these approaches are inherently non-normative in that they merely
describe existing understandings, even if some may be subtle and complex.
Here, it is important to recognize that Kant took “the highest principles and
fundamental concepts of morality” to be synthetic-a priori
because, although they do not lay at the foundation of their precepts the
concepts of pleasure and pain, of the desires and inclinations, etc., all of which
are of empirical origin, yet in the construction of a system of pure morality
these empirical concepts must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty,
as representing either a hindrance, which we have to overcome, or an
74
allurement, which must not be made into a motive.

That is to say these motives must be brought under the authority of the
categorical imperative, as a pure concept of our reason, before they can
become a basis for action.75 Although I do not intend to follow a synthetic-a

72. Id. at 49.
73. See Vincent J. Samar, Throwing Down the International Gauntlet: Same-Sex Marriage
as a Human Right, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 27–39, 43–55 (2007) (arguing that a
Gewirthian human rights approach would provide moral legitimacy for recognition of same sexmarriages under international and domestic law).
74. KANT, supra note 60, at 61.
75. Here, the idea of the categorical imperative is a synthetic-a priori idea for it derives out
of what we mean by a perfectly good will, which acts independent of desire or concern for
particular outcomes but just because doing the act is right. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9–10 (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merril Co. 1959) (1785).
Still, the idea of a perfectly good will cannot be found in any analysis of the concepts of good or
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priori approach in this article (I have done so elsewhere76), I point out its
significance to ethics because discussions of substantive due process rights is
often thought to presuppose—though not necessarily—rights that are part of an
already existing, longstanding moral tradition, and all the aforementioned four
approaches can be utilized to attempt an unraveling of such tradition.77
As previously stated, Kant doubted the value of an analytic-a posteriori
proposition.78 Kant’s concern was that before any appeal to experience would
be made, all conditions for the judgment would have been satisfied by an
analysis of the concept.79 In an article, Analytic A Posteriori Propositions,
Professor Virgil C. Aldrich explains:
Consider the proposition, ‘This is white’, where he who makes this statement
holds up in full view and broad daylight, say, a white candle. His companion
sees what is being talked about. Well, we agreed above that the subject of a
proposition is that about which something is said. In the case then of this
bedrock sort of singular proposition, the subject is not a concept [to be
analyzed] but something that both speaker and listener are looking at. It is a
precept. Even if neither of them know that what they are looking at is a
candle, which would be true if neither had heard about or experienced candles
before, this would not prevent them from understanding perfectly the
80
proposition, ‘This is white’.

will but merges to capture what it is that determines a situation to be morally right. See id. at 13–
14, 16–18. I often use two examples with students. The first is of two friends playing when one
reaches for a gun he believes to be a toy and ends up shooting his friend to death. The other is of
two people fighting when one reaches for a gun he believes to be real but because it is a toy only
shoots water in the other’s face. Almost instantly, everyone agrees that although the former has
the graver consequence, it is the latter that is fundamentally wrongful. And this is not found by
an analysis of the concepts or situation as such but by how the concepts come together to prove us
a notion of a good intention.
76. Samar, supra note 73.
77. Although Kant will later in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals try to establish
how the imperative might be proved provided we can not disavow freedom of the will, earlier he
notes that even if it cannot be proved, it is central to our idea of morality as something real. See
KANT, supra note 75, at 63–64. As he puts it:
How such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible and why it is necessary is
a problem whose solution does not lie within the boundaries of the metaphysics of morals.
Moreover, we have not here affirmed its truth, and even less professed to command a
proof of it. We showed only through the universally received concept of morals that
autonomy of the will is unavoidably connected with it, or rather that it is its foundation.
Whoever, therefore, holds morality to be something real and not a chimerical idea without
truth must also concede its principle which has been adduced here.
Id.
78. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
79. See KANT, supra note 60, at 49.
80. Virgil C. Aldrich, Analytic A Posteriori Propositions, 28 ANALYSIS 200, 200 (1968).
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What Professor Aldrich is saying might perhaps be better understood if we
think of how we come to identify a painting, photograph, or other image with a
particular experience, perhaps some past memory or present sensation of a
particular person, landscape, or thing. Here, the experience provides the data
that gives rise to our recognition in viewing the image. Our recognition arises
because the image contains elements in its depiction that correlate with the
data of our experience. Thus, the recognition is analytic but, at the same time,
a posteriori because it derives from our experience. It appears, at least for
empirical propositions, analytic-a posteriori knowledge is possible. However,
it remains a question whether this could extend to necessary propositions;81
although the recognition of the very process itself might constitute, at least, a
necessary assertoric true proposition.82 I believe Professor Aldrich had this in
mind when he goes on to say:
In short, having a concept of the subject of such singular propositions is not
necessary to their intelligibility or to their completeness, as long as their
subjects are clearly in view—or as long as the communicants see that of which
the predicate is predicated. They would be incomplete for one who hears the
statements and does not see what is being talked about, since in that
83
circumstance they virtually have no subjects.

Some may question whether the mind itself, in its recognition of the truth of
the proposition, plays an independent role such as making the proposition
appear analytic. I disagree because the mind also plays a perhaps similar role
in the recognition of analytic-a priori propositions when it understands the
meaning of the subject term.
In similar fashion, one can envision many subjects, including life
situations, in which the communicants can discern what is being predicated of
the subject without specific conceptual analysis of the subject. If that is the
case, then perhaps many of our precepts of what life includes can be identified
by how they correlate with the lived experiences we associate with them. And
if this is true, then perhaps our idea of what might make a right fundamental
for substantive due process purposes also can be gleaned from how the object
of the right is experienced by those most affected by it.84

81. I owe this critical point to my colleague Professor Victoria S. Wicki of the Loyola
University Philosophy Department.
82. Moreover, most synthetic a posteriori propositions are not necessary. That “water is
H2O” or that “a body has weight, “ KANT, supra note 60, at 49, is certainly not necessary, but just
happens to be the case in our world, and, in the latter instance, only when in the presence of a
gravitational field in our world.
83. Aldrich, supra note 80, at 200.
84. I should point out that Professor Aldrich’s view is not without criticism. In a paper by
Donald F. Henze, Henze takes to task Aldrich’s claim that propositions of this sort are analytic
rather than synthetic. As Henze argues:
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Herein lies how I see these four types of propositional judgments lining up
to unravel various meanings to substantive due process. The synthetic-a
posteriori proposition fits the scheme of one who seeks to find in the nature of
things a real connection, which is then assigned moral priority because it
contributes to the natural order, the so-called Natural Law position. Justice
Clarence Thomas’ view of law, and specifically substantive due process, seems
to follow this pathway, although perhaps at other times might seem a bit more
Kantian.85

I understand the crucial part of Aldrich’s argument to run as follows: The subject of P
[propositions of this sort] is not a concept but a ‘precept’, ‘something that both speaker
and listener are looking at’. P is about ‘its subject term, and this is the shown thing, not a
verbal term appearing in the sentence and expressing a concept’. The predicate however
is ‘a verbal term “white”‘ and what it ‘perceptibly denotes’ is contained or included in the
subject. Thus P is analytic. ‘But does this mean that it is necessarily true? Certainly not
in the sense that the candle has to be white. But that it is white, there and then, is
necessarily true, ex vi terminorum of “This is white” used in these circumstances.
Donald F. Henze, Aldrich’s Monstrous Supposition, 29 ANALYSIS 137, 137 (1969).
Henze wants to say that propositions of the P-type, whose subject is the word “this”, should
not be construed as precepts versus propositions. Id. In this he seeks to limit Ludwig
Wittengenstein’s statement that “‘[t]he demonstrative ‘this’ can never be without a bearer’” to be
just a “grammatical (logical) fact.” Id. (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 21 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958)). I, however, believe Henze is
being too shortsighted in claiming that “this is white” is true because “this” is used in these
circumstances and would not necessarily be true in other circumstances. As I try to show with
my painting (image) example, I believe much if not all of human recognition operates in this way.
In his reference to Wittgenstein, he ignores what Wittengenstein went on to say:
It might be said: “so long as there is a this, the word ‘this’ has a meaning too, whether this
is simple or complex.”—But that does not make the word into a name. On the contrary:
for a name is not used with, but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing.
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 84, at 21. Wittgenstein suggests that there is no thing the “this” need
refer to, but when it does refer to a thing, as when held up as Aldrich does when he says “this is
white”, it has to be white for the statement to be true.
85. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 7,
1991, at 41 (arguing that Justice Thomas’ writings, at least before joining the Court, indicate that
he subscribes to a kind of Natural Law theory); see also Laurence Tribe, Clarence Thomas and
“Natural Law,” N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991 at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/
07/15/opinion/clarence-thomas-and-natural-law.html. In contrast, Stanley Fish took a more
Kantian view of Justice Thomas when he noted on his New York Times Blog that:
Thomas replies in his dissent that if racial preferences of the kind the law school employs
will be illegal in 25 years, they are “illegal now,” for the Constitution, if it means
anything, “means the same thing today as it will in 300 months.” For Thomas, what is at
stake is the question of whether the Constitution has an unchanging meaning to which we
are obliged to adhere, or whether, on the other hand, the Constitution is a dynamic, living
document that adjusts to circumstances and the emergence of problems the founders never
contemplated.
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In contrast, the synthetic-a priori and analytic-a posteriori seems more
related to a living constitution in which abstract language allows for moral
growth, which in turn furthers our understanding of important constitutional
provisions.86 Justice Stevens seems to have been more in this camp, although
his often-pragmatic approach makes it unclear whether he is always starting
from broad concepts of liberty and equality or sometimes from a narrower
view of the implications of various decisions on different people’s lives.87
Stanley Fish, Revisiting Affirmative Action, With Help from Kant, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION
PAGES, Jan. 14, 2007, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/how-kant-might-viewaffirmative-action/.
86. See Dworkin, supra note 45, at 120.
87. William W. Fisher III, The development of modern American legal theory and the
judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND LAW 1791 AND 1991, at 266, 361 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud
Haakonssen eds., 1991). William W. Fisher has noted that:
[I]n his concurring opinion in Thornburg, Justice Stevens chastised Justice White for
failing to recognize that a woman must have control over her own body [a form of
autonomy] if she is to be free to define and pursue her ends in life:
If Justice White were correct in regarding the postconception decision of the question
whether to bear a child as a relatively unimportant, second-class sort of interest, I
might agree with his view that the individual should be required to conform her
decision to the will of the majority. But if that decision commands the respect that is
traditionally associated with the “sensitive areas of liberty” protected by the
Constitution, . . . no individual should be compelled to surrender the freedom to make
that decision for herself simply because her “value preferences” are not shared by the
majority.
Id. (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
777 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
But Fisher’s comments are not confined to any particular justice. Later in that same piece,
Fisher remarks that:
In the eight years between the original decision in Griswold [v. Connecticut] and the
explosive ruling in Roe [v. Wade], the focus of the Court’s concern gradually shifted from
the protection of privacy in the traditional sense of “freedom from surveillance or
disclosure of intimate affairs” to the protection of autonomy, that is, the right to make
certain sorts of choices free from private or governmental interference. In his opinion for
the Court in Carey v. Population Services International, Justice Brennan explained the
change in orientation as follows:
Griswold did state that by “forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating
their manufacture or sale,” the Connecticut statute . . . had “a maximum destructive
impact” on privacy rights. This intrusion into “the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms” made the statute particularly “repulsive.” But subsequent decisions have
made clear that the constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of
childbearing is not dependent on that element. Eisenstadt v. Baird[, 405 U.S. 438
(1972)], holding that the protection is not limited to married couples, characterized the
protected right as the “decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Similarly, Roe v.
Wade[, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)], held that the Constitution protects “a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.” These decisions put Griswold in proper
perspective. Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not
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The third approach, the analytic-a priori, fits the idea that the Constitution
is a dead (or enduring) document whose meaning is discerned by strictly
asking what expectation the Framers would have had for its various
provisions.88 This is the view of Justice Scalia89 and exposes why historicism
is so central to his analysis of constitutional texts. The fourth approach, the
analytic-a posteriori, is a view that I believe is held at times by Justice
Kennedy and former Justices Stevens and O’Connor, insofar as they attempt to
fit constitutional language to the real experiences of actual human beings.90 It
is the approach that focuses on the lived experiences of real people and the way
It essentially is a
those experiences fundamentally affect them.91
phenomenological approach because it focuses on what our experiences teach
us.92 My concern in also claiming it to also be analytically aposteriori is to
undercut any possible criticism that such phenomenological approaches might
arise from a misunderstanding of what is before us.
As stated above, I am not seeking to question the synthetic-a priori
approach, but rather suggest that approach is made even more persuasive when
its outcome is consistent with the lived experiences of actual human beings in
more than a synthetic way. Indeed, the persuasiveness of this combined
approach is illustrated from the analytic-a posteriori side in a recent district
court opinion addressing the question of whether there is a substantive due
process right to same-sex marriage. In the next section, I will be presuming
that one can derive from even a minimally robust notion of liberty a
justification for same-sex marriage, so that the focus there can be on whether
same-sex marriage might also be found from our experience of marriage today.
IV. THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
The constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriage provides an excellent
opportunity to examine the interface of the synthetic-a priori with the analytica posteriori. Our understanding of marriage has so changed over the centuries
that any attempt to limit it to a particular understanding from a particular
time—the so-called “historicist position”—will be inadequate.93 The same
problem does not arise for the synthetic-a priori, since there the questions are
prohibit a married couple’s use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters
of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by State.
Id. at 361–62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
678, 687 (1977)).
88. See SCALIA, supra note 36.
89. See SCALIA, supra note 36, at 47; Dworkin, supra note 44, at 119.
90. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1996).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See SCALIA, supra note 36, at 36, 47.
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not analytic; they are not limited to what marriage means nor to any set of
empirical conditions that some may regularly associate with marriage, such as
procreation and child rearing.94 To the contrary, the synthetic-a priori would
search for an understanding of the conditions that make it possible for marriage
to operate at all.95 So, I begin with the synthetic-a priori approach to see if
what I subsequently find from the analytic-a posteriori approach reaches the
same conclusion.
Here, questions concerning the autonomy of the person, and the possibility
that there could exist a capacity by which a person would be able to make
choices that are mutually beneficial, all become particularly relevant. The
investigation of these questions would not limit itself to a mere analysis of the
meaning of specific words like “marriage,” but would also take into account
the real life conditions necessary to claim one is married. Obviously, some of
these are legal, but others are internal to the persons.96 They are the
frameworks that make marriage valuable to them and why most would treat
marriage to elicit moral significance regardless of the particular moralistic
aspects often associated with religious teaching. This moral significance
encompasses Kant’s condition that maxims we set for ourselves be capable of
being applied universally irrespective of any consequences to, or aspirations or
sentiments of, the person.97
But the moral significance of marriage is not limited to its ability to be a
universal moral standard, for the moral significance of marriage, according to
another moral theorist, Alan Gewirth, must also provide a material connection
to human welfare or well-being.98 This proposition derives from the fact that

94. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 84.
95. See KANT, supra note 60, at 52–53.
96. See Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and Same-Sex Marriage: The Case for Treating Same-Sex
Marriage as a Human Right, 68 MONT. L. REV. 335, 354 (2007).
97. In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes:
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in
any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all
these effects (agreeableness of my own condition, indeed even the promotion of the
happiness of others) could be brought about through other causes and would not require
the will of a rational being, while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in
such a will. Therefore, the pre-eminent good can consist only in the conception of the law
in itself (which can be present only in a rational being) so far as this conception and not
the hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will.
KANT, supra note 75, at 20.
98. In Reason and Morality, Alan Gewirth states:
Although agents often identify their well-being with their possessing certain particular
goods, in such cases the well-being characterizes them not simply as agents but in some
more restricted capacity. It is also true that in some respects no sharp line can be drawn
between the general capabilities and the particular goods because the former are exercised
for the sake of the latter; and an agent who seldom or never achieved his particular
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all human action is purposive.99 Thus, when an action is undertaken
voluntarily, such as entering into a marriage, it must be understood to be done
for some purpose that the agent takes to be good or has some positive regard
for doing. What transforms the agent’s particular purpose into a moral good is
the Kantian requirement that it must at the same time be an action that all
humans could engage without contradiction.100 This account is synthetic and
not analytic because the purposes are not founded in any definition or image of
the agent or his action, but in what motivates a person to act. It is also a priori
because the conditions that make the action moral are not based on there being
empirical desires or motives of the moment, even if the desires or motives
were universally held, but rather on the fact that all human beings could
perform them without contradiction.101 Thus, the conditions are essential to
humans being able to engage in voluntary purposive action, without which
there would be no morality at all.102

purposes would also probably not have the general capabilities for achieving them. Wellbeing in the inclusive sense is hence to be understood as a continuum that comprises
having the general capabilities and successfully exercising them. Since, however, agency
is the condition of pursuing particular goods, the agent’s well-being is to be identified
primarily even if not exclusively with the general abilities and conditions required for
attaining any of his purposes. It is these abilities that are necessary goods for the agent
[qua agent], and they are states or dispositions of the agent himself as they impinge on his
purposive pursuits. Although the conditions of these pursuits may include circumstances
that are distinct from the agent, such circumstances are for his well-being and hence are a
part of his well-being.
ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 60–61 (1978).
99. See id. at 39.
100. See KANT, supra note 75, at 47–48.
101. Were the conditions limited to just the empirical desires or motivations being present,
the synthesis would be a posteriori, not a priori.
102. In laying the basis for what he will come to show as the relation between the generic
features of action and human rights, Gewirth writes:
In the broad senses in which each of them has been explicated here, voluntariness and
purposiveness exhaust the generic features of action. This can be seen by noting some of
the ways in which they have been or may be distinguished, despite their close interrelation
as concerned with reasons for acting. Voluntariness involves a procedural aspect of
actions in that it concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events.
Purposiveness, on the other hand, in addition to having the distinct procedural aspect
mentioned above [of allowing the agent to make “an implicit value judgment about
them”], also involves the substantive aspect of actions, the specific contents of these
events. Voluntariness refers to the means, purposiveness to the end; voluntariness
comprises the agent’s causation of his action, whereas purposiveness comprises the object
or goal of the action in the sense of the good he wants to achieve or have through his
causation. Thus voluntariness is a matter of initiation or control while purposiveness is at
least in part a matter of consummation. Other candidates for generic features of action,
such as adherence to rules or principle, deliberation or calculation of the consequences,
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So, from a synthetic-a priori moral perspective, the conditions for
marriage are not based simply on the meaning of particular words or even
depictions of specific events often associated with marriage, but on the role
marriage plays in fulfilling the lives of those participating in it.103 In this
sense, the right to marry satisfies the conditions for a moral right in the
Kantian/Gewirthian sense because, as I have argued elsewhere, when full
attention is paid to these conditions, they provide a kind of self-fulfillment that
would otherwise be unobtainable.104 And in this respect, reason shows that
same-sex couples stand no differently from opposite-sex couples with respect
to the human right to marry a person of one’s own choice.105
It is perhaps important to note how choice also operates to prevent
marriage recognition from being assigned to certain kinds of relationships.106
The parties to a marriage must be capable of acting voluntarily with knowledge
of relevant circumstances.107 Accordingly, age is likely to be relevant insofar
as it provides an index to establishing voluntariness. Similarly, consanguinity
may be relevant if the parties intend to have children or if an existing relation
is too close to insure that the decision to marry was freely entered into.108 Our
image of same-sex relationships can now be investigated both in terms of how
the parties might see themselves as well as how others might see them.

and so forth, either do not characterize all actions or else are derivative from and
subsumable under one or the other of the two features discussed above.
GEWIRTH, supra note 98, at 41.
103. The conditions that make moral action possible at all, such as voluntariness and
purposiveness, are presupposed by morality; they are not, strictly speaking, merely a matter of its
definition in which case they need have no effect on human action at all. Id. at 53.
104. In another article, I describe the self-fulfillment that follows out of marriage this way:
Marriage allows for the self-development of the moral virtues of justice, beneficence,
temperance, and courage based on the excellence by which one participates intimately in
the marital relationship. Marriage is not just a collection of rights or a celebration of
events, but rather a form of daily living encompassing the mundane and the extraordinary
of the people whose bond it is. Its contribution to human self-fulfillment thus sets it out
as a unique practice among existing social institutions. Marriage exhibits no difference
when the institution is formed between persons of the same-sex as against persons of
opposite-sex.
Samar, supra note 73, at 33 (discussing how same-sex marriage affirms human dignity).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 31–32.
107. Id. at 21.
108. Obviously, these are important questions and would need to be explored more fully
before they could be answered in any definitive way, but for purposes of this essay it is enough
that they be acknowledged.
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The moral approach I have just described essentially identifies a scheme
for a top-down synthetic-a priori argument for a human right to marry.109 As I
have provided a fuller account of this approach elsewhere, I will not provide
more detail on that matter here.110 Instead, I will argue, as I suggest at the end
of the preceding paragraph, for a bottom-up analytic-a posteriori argument that
makes same-sex marriage part and parcel of our understanding of the lived
experience of gay and lesbian couples today. To do this, however, I will need
to turn around the question from the previous paragraph. Instead of asking
whether faithfulness to human dignity requires interpreting the substantive due
process clause to recognize same-sex marriage, I ask here instead: Do the lived
experiences of same-sex couples not afford us an image of marriage as it has
come to be recognized in the late 20th and early 21st centuries?
To answer this question, I will not, in the first instance, be focusing on the
concept of marriage, as that term has been traditionally defined. Nor will I be
attempting to derive a right to marry based on human dignity. Instead, I will
engage the real life experiences of persons who are engaged in relationships
that appear to them as a marriage from their point of view. Is this not what our
current understanding of marriage is really about? For those who think
otherwise, I suggest they try viewing the image of marriage they hold from
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance concerning the parties’ sex, just to insure
that their image is not constructed out of animus or bias.111 Under this
constraint, I would suspect even those most opposed to same-sex marriage
could conjure up an image of married (or soon-to-be married) persons—when
the narrative presented focuses on the love the parties have for one another, as
displayed by mutually supportive interactions—without providing any
information about the parties’ sex.112 I further suspect that even the most
ardent proponent of bans for same-sex marriage would find it difficult to

109. See Samar, supra note 73, at 27–39, 43–55 (arguing that a Gewirthian human rights
approach would provide moral legitimacy for recognition of same sex-marriages under
international and domestic law).
110. Id.
111. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls describes the function of the “veil of ignorance” in
setting up a just society as follows:
Among the essential features of [the original position] is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one [sic] know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall
even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1999).
112. Id.
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differentiate same-sex from opposite-sex couples by any criterion other than
gender.113
Since the narrative provides the pathway to our vision of the relationship, it
is important that I say something more specifically about what that narrative
would likely contain. A fortiori, since the narrative we construct for same-sex
legal marriage will likely be more open than for traditional religious marriage,
it is particularly important that we construct our picture relying on what the
law envisions as a marriage since the law is not confined to any religious view.
To assist in this effort, I will rely on the findings of fact from the federal
district court for the Northern District of California in the recent case, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.114 The court took pains, when writing its decision that bans
on same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to establish a basis in evidence for its finding.115 As a prelude to
this discussion, it should be understood that I am using the word “lived” to
refer:
[T]o the way that a person experiences and understands his or her world as real
and meaningful. Lived meanings describe those aspects of a situation as
experienced by the person in it. For example, a teacher wants to understand
how a child meaningfully experiences or lives a certain situation even though
116
the child is not explicitly aware of these lived meanings.

A.

Background to the Case

Following voter adoption of Proposition 22 in 2000, amending California’s
Family Code to make marriage only between one man and one woman, the
California Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that Proposition 22 violated the equal
protection provision of the California constitution.117 Thereafter, a second
voter initiative (“Proposition 8”) was adopted in November 2008, this time
amending the California constitution, stating, “Only marriage between a man
and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”118 Opponents of
Proposition 8 challenged the initiative as violating the rules for amending the
California constitution, along with other arguments.119 However, this time the
Supreme Court of California upheld the initiative as to all new marriages,

113. Remember, at least with respect to legal marriage, the law does not require opposite-sex
couples to promise to have children, and in several states same-sex couples do have children
either by adoption, previous marriage, or surrogacy.
114. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
115. Id. at 953–73.
116. MAX VAN MANEN, RESEARCHING LIVED EXPERIENCE: HUMAN SCIENCE FOR AN
ACTION SENSITIVE PEDAGOGY 183 (1990).
117. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927–28.
118. Id. at 927.
119. Id.
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although the court allowed the 18,000 people, who had already gotten married,
to remain married.120
The case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which is a focus of this section, was
then brought by two same-sex couples in federal court who wanted to get
married but couldn’t, challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under
both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.121 The significance of this case for the
purposes of this article is not just the holding in favor of the opponents of
Proposition 8, but also Judge Walker’s careful elaboration of the impact this
law was having on the social relations and human psychology of those
prevented from marrying.122
B.

Legal Issues

The elaboration of the impact of this law arose out of both opponents
trying to show why Proposition 8 violated both the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses, and the proponents trying to show that the law violated
neither of these provisions. In particular, the opponents of Proposition 8
sought to show:
1. It prevents each plaintiff from marrying the person of his or her choice;
2. The choice of a marriage partner is sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment from the state’s unwarranted usurpation of that choice; and
3. California’s provision of a domestic partnership—a status giving same-sex
couples the rights and responsibilities of marriage without providing
marriage—does not afford plaintiffs an adequate substitute for marriage
and, by disabling plaintiffs from marrying the person of their choice,
invidiously discriminates, without justification, against plaintiffs and
123
others who seek to marry a person of the same sex.

While proponents argued that Proposition 8:
1. Maintains California’s definition of marriage as excluding same-sex
couples;
2. Affirms the will of California citizens to exclude same-sex couples from
marriage;
3. Promotes stability in relationships between a man and a woman because
they naturally (and at times unintentionally) produce children; and

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 928.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 991–1003.
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
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4. Promotes “statistically optimal” child-rearing households; that is,
households in which children are raised by a man and a woman married to
124
each other.

Based on the legal issues raised by the parties, the court identified the
following three questions to guide its understanding and evaluation of the
evidence presented:
1. WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CALIFORNIA’S REFUSAL
TO RECOGNIZE MARRIAGE BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE BECAUSE
OF THEIR SEX;
2. WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SHOWS CALIFORNIA HAS AN
INTEREST IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SAME-SEX AND
OPPOSITE-SEX UNIONS; and
3. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PROPOSITION 8 ENACTED A
PRIVATE MORAL VIEW WITHOUT ADVANCING A LEGITIMATE
125
GOVERNMENT INTEREST.

Because the evidence will implicate the lived experiences of many of
California’s gay and lesbian couples, I will follow the court’s structure and
take frequent quotes from the trial proceedings and summary of evidence in
Judge Walker’s decision.
C. The Evidence
With regard to the question of “whether any evidence supports California’s
refusal to recognize marriage between two people because of their sex,” the
plaintiff Zarrillo testified that he wished “to marry Katami because marriage
has a ‘special meaning’ that would alter their relationships with family and
others.”126 Zarrillo described going to the bank with his partner to open a joint

124. Id. at 931. The proponents actually toned down their assertions at trial from what the
trial court recognized were their broader assertions to the public in getting Proposition 8 passed.
Those earlier assertions stated:
1. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples preserves marriage;
2. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples allows gays and lesbians to live privately
without requiring others, including (perhaps especially) children, to recognize or
acknowledge the existence of same-sex couples;
3. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples protects children;
4. The ideal child-rearing environment requires one male parent and one female parent;
5. Marriage is different in nature depending on the sex of the spouses, and an oppositesex couple’s marriage is superior to a same-sex couple’s marriage; and
6. Same-sex couples’ marriages redefine opposite-sex couples’ marriages.
Id. at 930.
125. Id. at 932 (capitalization in original).
126. Id.
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account, and being asked, “Is it a business account?”127 Katami testified,
“[M]arriage to Zarrillo would solidify their relationship and provide them the
foundation they seek to raise a family together, explaining that for them, ‘the
timeline has always been marriage first, before family.’”128
Plaintiff Perry stated “that marriage would provide her what she wants
most in life: a stable relationship with Stier, the woman she loves and with
whom she has built a life and family.”129 As she put it, “I’m a 45-year-old
woman. I have been in love with a woman for 10 years and I don’t have a
word to tell anybody about that.”130 Stier, in turn, said:
[M]arrying Perry would make them feel included “in the social fabric.”
Marriage would be a way to tell “our friends, our family, our society, our
community, our parents . . . and each other that this is a lifetime
commitment . . . we are not girlfriends. We are not partners. We are
131
married.”

Historian Nancy Cott testified, “that marriage is ‘a couple’s choice to live
with each other, to remain committed to one another, and to form a household
based on their own feelings about one another, and their agreement to join in
an economic partnership and support one another in terms of the material
needs of life.’”132 On the proponents’ side, think tank founder David
Blankenhorn stated: “[M]arriage is ‘a socially-approved sexual relationship
between a man and a woman’ with a primary purpose to ‘regulate filiation.’”133
Cott, who “explained that marriage encompasses a socially approved sexual
union and an effective relationship and, for the state, forms the basis of stable
households and private support obligations,” broadened that view.134
The two experts disagreed over whether “historical changes in the
institution of marriage” added to or deinstitutionalized marriage, with Cott
emphasizing “removal of racial restrictions,” “elimination of coverture and
other gender-based distinctions,” and Blankenhorn emphasizing “an increase in
births outside of marriage and an increase in divorce rates.”135 But even
Blankenhorn admitted “that marriage would benefit same-sex couples and their
children, would reduce discrimination against gays and lesbians and would be

127. Id. at 933 (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1 at 84:8–12, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 528).
128. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 89:17–18).
129. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
130. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 154:21–23).
131. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 175:22; 172:8–12).
132. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 201:9–14).
133. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 11 at 2742:9–10, 18, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 530).
134. Id.
135. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
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‘a victory for the worthy ideas of tolerance and inclusion,’”136 although he
continued to worry that same-sex marriage would weaken marriage.137
Psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau stated: “[T]he desire of same-sex couples to
marry illustrates the health of the institution of marriage and not, as
Blankenhorn testified, the weakening of marriage.”138 That testimony was
further collaborated by economist Lee Badgett who “provided evidence that
same-sex couples would benefit economically if they were able to marry and
that same-sex marriage would have no adverse effect on the institution of
marriage or on opposite-sex couples.”139
On the question of whether California has an interest in differentiating
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, plaintiffs presented Psychologist
Gregory Herek who described and defined sexual orientation as:
[A]n enduring sexual, romantic, or intensely affectional attraction to men, to
women, or to both men and women. It’s also used to refer to an identity or a
sense of self that is based on one’s enduring patterns of attraction. And it’s
140
also sometimes used to describe an enduring pattern of behavior.

Herek further testified “that homosexuality is a normal expression of human
sexuality; the vast majority of gays and lesbians have little or no choice in their
sexual orientation; and therapeutic efforts to change an individual’s sexual
orientation have not been shown to be effective and instead pose a risk of harm
to the individual.”141
Although the proponents offered no testimony to contradict Herek, they
did cross-examine him on whether “some individuals report fluidity in their
sexual orientation.”142 Herek’s response was that the vast majority of people
are consistent in their sexual orientation.143 Peplau also noted that “despite
stereotypes suggesting gays and lesbians are unable to form stable
relationships, same-sex couples are in fact indistinguishable from opposite-sex
couples in terms of relationship quality and stability.”144 And social
epidemiologist Ilan Meyer testified “that Proposition 8 stigmatizes gays and
lesbians because it informs gays and lesbians that the State of California rejects
their relationships as less valuable than opposite-sex relationships.”145

136. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 12 at 2850:12–13, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 531).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 9 at 2025:5–12, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 525).
141. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 934–35.
142. Id. at 935.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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According to Meyer, “Proposition 8 also provides state endorsement of private
discrimination,” which “increases the likelihood of negative mental and
physical health outcomes for gays and lesbians.”146
With respect to children, the “[p]sychologist Michael Lamb testified that
all available evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are
just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents;
and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether an adult is a good
parent.”147 To proponent studies claiming that married couples provide an
ideal child-rearing environment, Lamb responded that these studies compared
not families headed by same-sex couples versus opposite-sex couples, but
rather families headed by single parents or step-parents versus opposite-sex
couples.148 The experts, Lamb and Blankenhorn, “disagreed on the importance
of a biological link between parents and children.”149 However, as the court
noted, “none of the studies Blankenhorn relied on isolates the genetic
relationship between a parent and a child as a variable to be tested.”150
A number of experts testified that both the State of California and its “gay
and lesbian population suffer because domestic partnerships are not equivalent
to marriage.”151 Badgett explained that because “gays and lesbians are less
likely to enter domestic relationships than to marry,” fewer gays and lesbians
have the protection of a state-recognized relationship.”152 Both she “and San
Francisco economist Edmund Egan testified that states receive greater
economic benefits from marriage than from domestic partnerships.”153
Meyer testified that domestic partnerships actually stigmatize gays and
lesbians even when enacted for the purpose of providing rights and benefits to
same-sex couples. Cott explained that domestic partnership cannot substitute
for marriage because domestic partnerships do not have the same social and
historical meaning as marriage and that much of the value of marriage comes
from its social meaning. Peplau testified that little of the cultural esteem
154
surrounding marriage adheres to domestic partnerships.

146. Id.
147. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id at 936.
152. Id.
153. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 936.
154. Id. Herek referenced a letter from the California Secretary of State to registered
domestic partnerships that informed “them of upcoming changes to the law and [suggested]
dissolution of their partnership to avoid any unwanted financial effects.” Id. (citing Transcript of
Proceedings Volume 9, supra note 140, at 2047:15–2048:5). Herek pondered whether a similar
letter would have been sent to married couples suggesting divorce. Id. (citing Transcript of
Proceedings Volume 9, supra note 140, at 2048:6–13).
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This expert testimony was consistent with Stier’s testimony.155 Stier has a
registered domestic partnership with Perry, but, as she explained, “there is
certainly nothing about domestic partnership . . . that indicates the love and
commitment that are inherent in marriage.”156
As to the question whether the evidence shows Proposition 8 enacts a
private moral view, the court noted that “[t]he testimony of several witnesses
disclosed that a primary purpose of Proposition 8 was to ensure that California
confer a policy preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples
based on a belief that same-sex pairings are immoral and should not be
encouraged in California.”157
The historian George Chauncey testified that “the Proposition 8 campaign
emphasized the importance of protecting children and relied on stereotypical
images of gays and lesbians.” The “campaign did not need to explain what
children were to be protected from; the advertisements relied on a cultural
understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to children. “Chauncey
noted that stereotypes of gays and lesbians as predators or child molesters were
reinforced in the mid-twentieth century and remain part of current public
158
discourse.

On the effect of these moral views for political change, political scientist
Gary Segura “testified that negative stereotypes about gays and lesbians inhibit
political compromise with other groups,” and he “identified religion as the
chief obstacle to gay and lesbian political advances.”159 However, “[p]olitical
scientist Kenneth Miller disagreed with Segura’s conclusion . . . pointing to
some successes [that gays and lesbians have made] on the state and national
level.”160 That said, proponent Hak-Shing William Tam testified that he
“operates the website ‘1man1woman.net’,”161 which “encouraged voters to
support Proposition 8 on grounds that homosexuals are twelve times more
likely to molest children,162 . . . and because [non-passage of] Proposition 8
will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands.”163

155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 171:8–11).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 937.
159. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 937 (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 7 at 1565:2–4,
1561:6–9, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292
VRW), ECF No. 507 (“It’s very difficult to engage in the give-and-take of the legislative process
when I think you are an inherently bad person.”)).
160. Id. at 936 (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 10 at 2482:4–8, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 529).
161. Id. at 937 (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 8 at 1916:3–24, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 524).
162. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 8, supra note 161, at 1919:3–1922:21).
163. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 8, supra note 161, at 1928:6–13).
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Explaining the effect of these campaigns on their well-being, plaintiff
Katami stated that “he was angry and upset that children needed to be
protected from him, . . . ‘it just demeans you.’”164 As the mother of four
children, Steir felt:
[T]he campaign messages were “used to sort of try to educate people or
convince people that there was a great evil to be feared and that evil must be
stopped and that evil is us, I guess. . . . And the very notion that I could be part
of what others need to protect their children from was just—it was more than
165
upsetting. It was sickening, truly. I felt sickened by that campaign.

Economically, “Egan and Badgett testified that Proposition 8 harms the
State of California and its local governments,” and “Egan explained that San
Francisco lost and continues to lose money because Proposition 8 slashed the
number of weddings performed in San Francisco.”166 The proponents
challenged their testimony only as to “the magnitude and not the existence of
the harms Egan identified.”167 Based on the testimony and other evidence
presented, including the lack of credibility of proponents’ experts’ testimony,
the court determined that “the evidence presented at trial fatally undermines
the premises underlying proponents’ proffered rationales for Proposition 8.”168
Furthermore,
[t]he evidence demonstrated beyond serious reckoning that Proposition 8 finds
support only in [conjecture, speculation, fears and moral] disapproval. As
such, Proposition 8 is beyond the constitutional reach of the voters or their
169
representatives.

V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have sought to present a new direction for arguments
concerning substantive due process rights. In addition to the more familiar
analytic-a priori, synthetic-a posteriori, and synthetic-a priori type arguments,
I have sought to present an argument emphasizing the phenomenological lived
experience of real people, which I designated an analytic-a posteriori
argument. I then sought to apply that argument to the recent same-sex
marriage case rising from the Northern District of California to show how it
might enlighten the findings of fact in that case and its significance for the
lives of gay and lesbian couples generally.
My point throughout has been to bolster the persuasive legitimacy of
substantive due process rights claims when they can be founded on more than a
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 938 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 108:14–16).
Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 177:9–18).
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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single methodological approach. In the California case, I suggested that the
decision reached by Judge Walker would be consistent with both a synthetic-a
priori approach and an analytic-a posteriori approach. As such, it should be
held in high esteem because now two very different methodological
approaches have essentially reached the same result.
If I am correct in my suggestion of using a second approach to bolster a
substantive due process rights decision in this particular case, perhaps the same
methodology might be used more broadly to consider the persuasiveness of
other claims that are likely to come before the Court. At least at this point, this
methodological approach would seem worthy of further investigation.

